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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the role played by different trade barriers (transport
costs, customs and currency) in the evolution of Spanish imports during the
First Globalization (1870-1913). Through the estimation of several gravity
equations with panel data analysis, we obtain the elasticities of imports to
each barrier, which allows us to combine them into a single ad valorem
measure of barriers to trade (which we call the trade costs tariff equivalent).
More interestingly, the contribution of the barriers to the profile of the tariff
equivalent, as well as the assignment of an active role to the peseta exchange
rate as a barrier, illustrates the existence of a protectionist backlash against
the sustained decline in transport costs in the period 1870-1913.
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RESUMEN
En este artı´culo se analiza la influencia de diferentes barreras al comercio
(costes de transporte, aranceles y tipo de cambio) sobre la evolucio´n de las
importaciones espan˜olas durante la Primera Globalizacio´n (1870-1913). En
primer lugar, partiendo de la ecuacio´n de gravedad, se obtiene la elasticidad
importacio´n a cada barrera. En segundo lugar, haciendo uso de esas elasti-
cidades, las distintas barreras se combinan en una medida ad valorem sin-
te´tica (una tarifa equivalente) de obsta´culos al comercio. La contribucio´n de
cada barrera a esta tarifa equivalente permite ilustrar el papel jugado por la
cotizacio´n de la peseta, adema´s de localizar en 1890-1891 la reaccio´n pro-
teccionista espan˜ola a la sostenida caı´da internacional de los costes de
transporte en el u´ltimo tercio del siglo XIX.
Palabras clave: ecuacio´n de gravedad, proteccio´n, costes de transporte,
siglo XIX
1. INTRODUCTION
The literature generally presents the period 1870-1913 as the high water-
mark of 19th century globalization (Daudin et al. 2008), which is known as the
First Globalization to contrast it with the post-World War II (WWII) process of
international integration. However, there is also agreement that, during the
period 1870-1913, the advance of international integration itself triggered a
retreat from pro-global postures (Williamson 1998, 2002). This retreat has been
explained as a protectionist backlash: partly in response to the grain invasion
of continental Europe caused by technological improvements in transport
(O’Rourke 1997) and partly as a reply of the European periphery to the cus-
toms increases of its core-country partners (Blattman et al. 2003; Williamson
2006). In any case, the popular wisdom is that there was an anti-globalization
reaction during the globalization process during 1870-1913 that, for Spain, has
been traditionally associated with the protectionist changes of the 90s.
First, in December 1890, as a declared response to the drop in transport
costs, duties on grain and meat were substantially increased in Spain. A year
later, in December 1891, as part of a strategy to force France to negotiate a
new treaty, duties on manufactured goods were also increased. The resulting
rise in customs, because of its intensity, has led the literature to talk about a
90s protectionist swerve (the viraje proteccionista, Serrano-Sanz 1987).
Moreover, part of the academic community has claimed that the deterrent
effect of raised customs on imports was then reinforced by the simultaneous
depreciation of the Spanish peseta (Prados de la Escosura 1988, 1997; Prados
de la Escosura and Tena 1994).
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Therefore, three main barriers have supposedly influenced Spanish trade
during 1870-1913 (international transport costs, customs and currency) and
the aim of this paper is to disentangle the role that each one played over time
by using a gravitational approach. The approach, of course, is not new. In the
last decade, a number of works have analyzed the forces that drove trade
during the First Globalization by introducing different measures of, or
proxies for, trade barriers into a gravity equation (Estevadeordal et al. 2003;
Lo´pez-Co´rdova and Meissner 2003; Flandreau and Maurel 2005; Mitchener
and Weidenmier 2008; Jacks and Pendakur 2010).
However, none of these papers have compared the specific evolution of the
different trade barriers for the period 1870-1913, which is the comparison we
carry out for Spain. In this task, we can exploit a range of measures of customs
barriers, instead of using proxies or the traditional ratio of customs revenues
over total imports used in multi-country analyses to date. Moreover, given that
for most of the period under examination, the peseta exchange rate was in a
floating regime, instead of the traditional dummies used in multi-country
panels to capture the effects of adherence or non-adherence to the gold
standard, we consider the size and sign of the peseta exchange rate departures
from parity between 1870 and 1913 and their effects on trade.
The results from estimating the gravity equation for different panel data
samples confirm that, whatever the customs variable considered, transport
costs and currency variables are always significantly linked to imports.
However, the customs variable only appears significant when considering the
measures that control for the sample of goods over time. This might explain
the difficulties experienced by some studies in finding a significant rela-
tionship between customs and imports when using the simple ratio between
customs revenues and total imports1.
More interestingly, as we have directly estimated the elasticity of substitu-
tion for Spanish imports, we can combine the three kinds of variables into a
costs function to obtain a single measure of barriers to trade. According to our
estimations, this synthetic measure, the trade costs tariff equivalent, averaged an
ad valorem tariff of 112 per cent during 1870-1913, 65 points coming from
transport costs, 22 from customs and only 7 from the exchange rate. Thus, on
average, the exchange rate seems to have played a minor deterrent role com-
pared with that of the other barriers. This finding fits in with the idea of those
who hold that, in the long run, the peseta played a minor role as a trade barrier.
However, when instead of static averages, we consider the evolution of the
trade costs tariff equivalent and its three components over time, the resulting
picture tells a much richer story. To start with, we find that the peseta acted
both as a barrier to and a boost for trade at different moments during the
period. In the 80s, the exchange rate moved under parity contributing, together
1 This occurs when Estevadeordal et al. (2003) introduce this ratio into a gravity equation that
uses world trade pooled data for 1913, 1928 and 1938.
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with customs and transport, to a reduction of the trade costs tariff equivalent.
This is in clear contrast to what happened in the 90s, when a chain of excep-
tional depreciations that culminated in the year of the defeat against the United
States (1898) raised a currency barrier which, added to the increased customs,
broke the downward trend of the tariff equivalent. Once the war was over, the
peseta adjusted to a new movement of appreciation that significantly reduced its
height as a barrier. Therefore, we find that the exchange rate played an active
role during the period 1870-1913, in some periods reinforcing the movement of
customs, in others playing an offsetting role. In this way, this paper reconciles
the two positions, one assigning a minor long-run role and the other an active
short-run role to the peseta as a barrier, that coexist in the literature.
Finally, the aforementioned reversal in the downward trend of the trade
costs tariff equivalent confirms the 90s as the moment of the Spanish pro-
tectionist backlash. The breaking down of the tariff equivalent into its com-
ponents illustrates how, before the 90s, the sharp reduction of transport costs
ran in parallel to a slight decrease in customs, both contributing, along with
the exchange rate, to the decline of the Spanish trade costs tariff equivalent.
In the 90s, however, the increase in customs stopped the falling trend of
the tariff equivalent, thus reflecting the Spanish backlash against the drop
in transport costs and the abandonment of the premises of free trade in
continental Europe, especially in France.
The result is the story of anti-globalization within globalization to which
we have referred. As a sign of globalization, the Spanish tariff equivalent
average decreased between 1870-1890 and 1891-1913, although to a much
lesser extent than if currency and, especially, customs had not raised barriers
in the 90s. Without the anti-globalizing role played by the Spanish idiosyn-
cratic barriers to trade (customs plus currency), we have estimated that the
decline in transport costs would have trebled the growth of imports at the
end of the period 1870-1913.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the second section, we
present the procedure and data used in the estimation of the gravity equa-
tion. In the third section, we discuss the evolution of the trade costs tariff
equivalent and relate the dynamics shown by its three components to the
historical narrative. In the fourth section, we conclude.
2. THE PROCEDURE AND DATA
As we have said, our goal is to establish the channels whereby different
sources of costs affected Spanish trade in the First Era of Globalization. To
this end, we consider three kinds of directly measured barriers (customs,
maritime transport costs and exchange rates) that are introduced into a
gravity equation a` la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). These authors,
starting from a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function
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where the prices of imported goods reflect «iceberg» trade costs, propose the
following gravity equation:
Xij ¼ Yi  Yj
Yw
tij
Pi  Pj
 1s
½1
where Xij denotes exports from country i to country j; Yi and Yj represent the
respective national GDPs; Yw is the total world income and s the elasticity of
substitution between products; tij is the bilateral trade cost factor (one plus
the tariff equivalent of trade barriers) and Pi and Pj denote country i’s and
country j’s price indexes. The specific expression of these price indexes is:
Y1s
i
¼
X
j
Ps1
j
yjt1sij 8i
P1sj ¼
X
i
Ys1
i
yit1sij 8j
where yi denotes the share of world income of country i.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) refer to Pi and Pj as multilateral
resistance indexes since, by construction, they consider the average trade
resistance between a country and its partners. Index Pi weighs the trade costs of
country i when exporting to all its partners. Index Pj weighs the trade costs
imposed by importer country j to all its partners. To explain bilateral trade flows,
the bilateral trade cost factor has to be compared to the product of the multi-
lateral indexes. The authors summarize the rationale for this comparison as
follows: Given a bilateral barrier between i and j (tij), a higher multilateral
resistance of country j (higher barriers in j for other partners; Pj) will reduce the
relative prices of goods from i and increase its exports to j. Analogously, a higher
multilateral resistance of country i (higher barriers faced by i from other part-
ners;Pi) will reduce the supply price of goods from i and increase its exports to j.
Given our specific interest in analyzing Spanish imports, we express
equation [1] as:
Xis ¼ Msi ¼
Yi  Ys
Yw
tis
Pi  Ps
 1s
½2
where Msi denotes Spain’s imports from country i, Ys is the Spanish GDP and
Ps represents Spain’s multilateral resistance.
Thus, the theoretical stochastic expression in which we are interested
becomes:
log Msi ¼ Ksi þ log Yi þ log Ys þ ð1sÞ log tisð1sÞ logPið1sÞ log Ps þ is
½3
We assume that the bilateral trade cost factor tis can be defined as a
multiplicative function of different trade barriers, tis5P (Zis n)
ln, where Zis n
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(n51yN) denote the barriers and ln are the observable individual elasticities
of each component Zisn. Finally, if we introduce the trade costs function tsj into
equation [3], we obtain the expression:
log Mij ¼ Ksi þ log Yi þ log Ys þ ð1sÞ
X
ln log Zisnð1sÞlogPið1sÞ log Ps þ is
½4
or more specifically, since we consider three kinds of barriers (customs, ct;
currency, CU; and maritime transport costs, tcr), the expression to estimate is
(where all the variables are in logs):
mij ¼ ksi þ yi þ ys þ ð1sÞl1ct þ ð1sÞl2cr þ ð1sÞl3tcrð1sÞpið1sÞps þ is
½5
Starting from this equation, the estimation of coefficients for the three
barriers gn5 (12s)ln n51,2,3, enables us to compute the individual elasticities
in the trade costs function as ln5gn/(12s) and the tariff equivalent for each
barrier Zn as (Zis n)
ln. This is possible since, according to Feenstra (2002, 2004),
when working with the simple customs average, the coefficient estimated in a
gravity equation is equal to (12s). This means that the elasticity l151 or, in
other words, the tariff equivalent for the simple customs average is the average
itself. Therefore, we can derive the elasticity value from the g1 coefficient, then
calculate the elasticities for the other two barriers and, finally, combine the
customs, currency and transport costs tariff equivalents into a multiplicative
trade costs function to obtain a synthetic trade costs tariff equivalent.
The data used to calculate this synthetic tariff equivalent come from the
following sources. The availability of data for the period 1870-1913 allows us
to work with a sample of twenty countries (Australia, the Austro-Hungarian
empire, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
Uruguay, the United Kingdom and the United States). National GDPs
(expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars) come from Maddison (2009). As
regards the bilateral flows, import figures have been obtained from the
Spanish annual Foreign Trade Statistics, first converted to dollars and then
to 1990 dollars with the U.S. deflator of Taylor (2002). The value of Spanish
imports from these countries averaged 80 per cent of total imports during
1870-1913. The figures for total exports in domestic currency come from
Mitchell (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and have been converted to dollars by
applying the exchange rates in the Global Financial Data site (http://
www.globalfindata.com) and then corrected by the U.S. deflator.
As previously mentioned, three different kinds of barriers are included in
our trade costs function: maritime costs, customs tariffs and those associated
with exchange rates. Starting with maritime shipping costs, there is a pervasive
agreement that these costs registered an overall declining trend during the
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period 1870-1913, as shown by Mohammed and Williamson (2004) in their
real global freight rate index. The same occurs with the indexes of country-
pair specific freight rates offered in Jacks and Pendakur (2010). These
authors construct indexes between the United Kingdom and 21 other
countries for the period 1870-1913, and conclude that freight rates fell on
average by 50 per cent in this period. In Figure 1, we show the paths of
shipping costs between the United Kingdom and Spain and between the
United Kingdom and Spain’s main trade partners, all of which are quite
reminiscent of the pattern shown by the commodity- and city-specific Coal to
Genoa freight rate index of Mohammed and Williamson (2004). The indexes
of transport costs of Jacks and Pendakur (2010) are used in our estimation
while, as explained later in the paper, the indexes of Mohammed and
Williamson (2004) are used to test the robustness of the results.
More specifically, we use the United Kingdom–Spain freight rate series of
Jacks and Pendakur (2010) to proxy the evolution of bilateral Spanish
shipping costs with its main partners and also with Austria, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Portugal. The indexes between the United Kingdom and
Australasia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Sweden–Norway (for Sweden,
Norway and Finland), the United States and Uruguay are taken as repre-
sentative of the respective maritime transport costs between Spain and each
FIGURE 1
SHIPPING FREIGHT RATES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SPAIN AND
SPAIN0S MAIN PARTNERS
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of these countries that, once again, follow a clear downward trend. By doing
so, we are assuming that, for the nearest countries, the United Kingdom–
Spain index is representative of the evolution of Spain’s short-haul freight
rates. For the most distant countries, we are assuming that the deeper
downward trends registered by the United Kingdom routes are representa-
tive of the evolution of Spain’s long-haul freight rates2. Of course, we are
conscious that the transport revolution of the 19th century was not limited to
shipping. There was also a decline in land transport costs associated with the
spread of railroads. However, we assume that, for a peninsular country like
Spain, maritime transport played the most important role in explaining its
integration into the world market3.
Concerning tariff barriers, in Figure 2, we show different measures of
trade-weighted nominal protection. The trajectory of Weighted 1 corresponds
to the ratio of tariff revenues over the value of total imports as registered in the
official Spanish Foreign Trade Statistics. It is worth remarking that, in the
Spanish case, the unreliability of official import unit values introduces sig-
nificant bias into the calculation of the ad valorem rates of protection4. For this
reason, we also work with measures such as Weighted 2 and Weighted 3 that
take into account the falsity of the import unit values in the official statistics.
Weighted 2 is calculated by dividing the tariff revenue by the corrected import
values in Prados (1986). Weighted 3 comes from Tena (2006), who adds the
surcharges on sugar imports to the import revenues. We have modified these
three series to take into account the payment of Spanish tariffs in gold from
1906 on, which meant an appreciable surcharge on duties5. Payment in gold is
also taken into account in the trade-weighted measure Weighted 4 constructed
2 According to Valdaliso (1991), there were no Spanish reports on freight rates in the late
19th century and, when data started appearing in Spanish magazines at the beginning of the 20th
century, they were a reproduction of the freight rates reported in British sources. These data were
taken as representative of the evolution of transport costs affecting the Spanish foreign trade,
because of the dominium of British merchants. The market share of Spanish merchants fell below
20 per cent in the last third of the 20th century following the «colonization» of the Spanish routes,
which was possible partly because of Spain’s geographical position on oceanic and Mediterranean
routes and partly because the United Kingdom was the main consumer of Spanish raw materials
and agricultural products. References to the intense fall in maritime transport costs and the
increasing competition from British merchants are abundant in the sessions of the Spanish par-
liament. See, for example, Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (DSCD) of July 8, 1876,
March 16 and 19, 1882, February 21 and March 21, 1883, March 2, 1885, July 5, 1889 or July 13,
1891 (www. Congreso.es).
3 The proportion between overland and maritime Spanish imports (of 1 to 3) remained quite
stable from 1870 to 1913 (Spanish Foreign Trade Statistics, http://biblioteca.meh.es/basiscicdocs).
In fact, entries from the main origin of Spanish land imports, France, amounted to less than 20 per
cent of our sample import value during the 80s, at the peak of Spanish–French pre-WWI trade.
4 By using the market values with which Prados (1986) estimated the series of Spanish imports
for the period 1850-1913, Sabate´ and Pardos (2001) showed the importance of deviations between
market and official values for specific goods over the period 1870-1913.
5 From 1906 to 1913, the depreciation of the peseta note with respect to the official gold peseta
parity was around 9 per cent.
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by Tirado (1994). In this case, the official values are also corrected but, instead
of considering all products registered in the Spanish Foreign Trade Statistics
during 1870-1913, the author uses an unchangeable selection of highly
representative goods over the period. In Weighted 5, the sample only considers
the industrial goods in Weighted 4. Therefore, both these indexes have the
advantage of avoiding the risk that variations in the aggregate measure might
simply be reflecting variations in the goods composition of trade, thus blurring
the relationship between commercial policy and trade.
However, as is well known, trade-weighted averages endogenize the
constraint effect of customs increases on trade and, consequently, there is
always a bias of undervaluation in these measures. The higher the tariff
applied to a certain good, the lower its imports and, consequently, the lower
the weight of the highest taxed goods in the calculation of the aggregate level
of protection. For this reason, it is important to have, as well as trade-
weighted averages, simple arithmetic averages which, in turn, are the type of
measures to consider in a theoretically well-founded version of the gravity
equation. The simple arithmetic average, Simple 1, shown in Figure 3 along
with Weighted 4, is offered in Tirado (1994), both of them for the same
sample of representative goods mentioned above. Simple 2 is the simple
arithmetic average once overseas products have been excluded. It is clear
FIGURE 2
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how both simple averages, as expected, reach higher values than the
weighted rate. The same occurs if we compare Weighted 5 to Simple 3,
where the latter is the simple average for the industrial goods included in
Simple 1. This point is also illustrated for Spain by Tena (1999), when
comparing different customs measures for a number of years during the
period 1870-1913. The levels are always higher for simple than weighted
measures, whether the latter are weighted by actual trade or the trade
structure prior to the enforcement of a new bill. In any case, the interruption
of the declining trend of tariff barriers in the 90s is a common feature for all
the yearly series mentioned above, including the profile shown by the esti-
mations of Tena (1999). Therefore, as previously mentioned, we can exploit a
range of measures of customs barriers, although none of them are available
in bilateral terms, a shortcoming which we consider minimized because the
Most Favoured Nation Clause was the rule for Spain’s commercial policy
during 1870-1913.
Finally, we have considered the role played by the peseta exchange rate in
Spanish external trade. Unlike most western currencies, the peseta never
formally belonged to the gold standard, there being only a partial gold con-
vertibility from 1876 to 1882. In Figure 4, we show the performance of the
nominal rates of the peseta against its main partners’ currencies which, after
Germany adhered to gold in 1871 and the United States won the battle
FIGURE 3
SIMPLE AND TRADE-WEIGHTED CUSTOMS TARIFFS
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against silver in 1874, exhibit a noticeable parallelism in their evolution6. The
Spanish lack of commitment to gold emerges clearly in the early 90s. It was
then that the peseta began to depreciate and this depreciation gathered pace
in the years of the war against Cuba and the United States (1895-1898). After
this plunge in its external value, the Spanish currency adjusted to a path of
recovery until the end of the period.
Our interest in the exchange rate, however, goes beyond its nominal
evolution. Its role, either as a barrier to or as a boost for imports, depends on
whether the interaction between nominal rates and relative prices determines
episodes of real depreciation or appreciation for the peseta, respectively.
Therefore, we focus on the peseta real exchange rates, which we calculate for
the countries with available data by correcting the nominal rate through the
corresponding relative price index (Spanish over foreign prices). The prices
are GDP deflators: the Spanish deflator comes from Prados (2003) and the
foreign ones from Mitchell (2003a), except for the Dutch, Portuguese
and Uruguayan figures that come from Smits et al. (2000), Lains (2006) and
Be´rtola (mimeo), respectively. The indexes of real exchange rates are shown in
Figure 5. Here again, we find a very similar evolution of the peseta exchange
FIGURE 4
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES FOR GOLD CORE COUNTRIES
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6 For a complete chronology of each country’s adherence to the gold standard, see Bordo and
Schwartz (1996) and Officer (EH.net).
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rates against most of the currencies considered, consistent with their general
commitment to gold. In fact, the two countries with the shortest commitment,
Italy and Brazil, especially the latter, are those that exhibit the weakest
adjustment to the gold core-countries’ real exchange average7.
For the gold currencies, the evolution of the peseta real exchange rate
goes through three stages. First, there is a movement of real appreciation in
the 80s, which turns into a movement of depreciation in the 90s. Once the
war is over, the peseta adjusts to a new trend of real appreciation. We select
the profile depicted by the core-countries’ average as representative of the
evolution of the peseta real exchange rate for all the countries in our sample
(including those for which we have no information) except for Italy and
Brazil, for which we will consider their respective real exchange rate
indexes8. In the next section, we examine how these real exchange rate
indexes along with maritime transport costs and customs influenced the
performance of Spanish imports in the First Era of Globalization.
FIGURE 5
REAL EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES
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Source: Mitchell (2003a), Prados (2003), Be´rtola (mimeo), Smits et al. (2000) and Lains (2006).
7 Italy adhered to the gold standard from 1884 to 1894 and Brazil did so in 1888-1889 and from
1906 to 1913.
8 Thus, we are assuming that, based on their commitment to gold, Austria, Belgium, Canada
and Japan adjusted their real exchange rate patterns to that averaged by the gold-core countries.
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3. ANTI-GLOBALIZATION WITHIN GLOBALIZATION
As observed in the previous section, the expression to estimate is:
mij ¼ ksi þ yi þ ys þ ð1sÞl1ct þ ð1sÞl2cr þ ð1sÞl3tcrð1sÞpið1sÞps þ is
½6
However, some practical problems arise. In theory, the difference
between the prices of countries i and s included in the gravity equation
should reflect the effect of relative trade barriers on bilateral flows, for which
the available price indexes can only be considered as a proxy. Consumer
price indexes and GDP deflators include non-tradable goods prices and,
furthermore, certain trade barriers are not reflected in prices. For this rea-
son, Feenstra (2002) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) proxied the
multilateral_resistance effect by using source and destination region fixed
effects. However, with our data panel, which covers only one country (Spain)
during a relatively short period (1870-1913), the use of country-year effects
would leave us without enough degrees of freedom9. Neither can we solve
the problem by using country-period effects (country dummies interacting
with 2-, 3-, 4- or 5-year-period dummies) because of problems of multi-
collinearity10. Therefore, we propose an alternative way to proxy the multi-
lateral resistance effect on the basis of the model of Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003), summarized in Section 2.
According to these authors, the bilateral trade cost factor between i and j
(in our case, the barrier between country i and Spain, tis) has to be compared
to the product of the multilateral indexes (country i’s and Spain’s price
indexes, Pi and Ps). The rationale for this comparison is that, given a bilateral
barrier between i and Spain, a reduction in barriers faced by i from other
partners will raise its total exports, increasing the supply price of i’s goods
and reducing its exports to Spain. Thus, if we read an increase in i’s total
exports as the result of a reduction in its multilateral barriers, one way to
proxy the multilateral resistance depressing effect of this on i’s exports to
Spain is to discount the value of i’s total exports from Yi. By doing so, we are
reducing i’s exporter potential to Spain. Analogously, given a bilateral barrier
between i and Spain, a reduction in the barriers between Spain and the rest
of its trade partners will increase the relative prices of goods from i and
reduce Spanish imports from country i. Thus, if we read an increase in its
total imports from third partners as the result of a decrease in its multilateral
9 The country-fixed effects have been used to avoid any bias due to omitted variables related to
causes other than multilateral resistance effects.
10 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this procedure. We tried to capture multi-
lateral resistance by introducing country-period dummies into the estimation of expression [6].
However, this procedure introduced a serious problem of multicollinearity into the estimation,
reflected in the loss of significance of the variables of interest (customs and transport costs barriers).
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barriers, one way to proxy this other multilateral resistance depressing effect
on Spanish imports from i is to discount the value of Spanish total imports
(except i’s) from Ys. By doing so, we are reducing the Spanish importer
potential from country i.
Consequently, our instrumental version of the gravity equation is as
follows:
mij ¼ ksi þ yi þ ys þ ð1sÞl1ct þ ð1sÞl2cr þ ð1sÞl3tcrs þ is ½7
where Yi* and Ys* denote i’s and Spain’s GDPs, after discounting the levels
of country i’s total exports and Spain’s imports from third countries,
respectively.
We use several measures of customs protection and the indexes of
maritime freight rates of Jacks and Pendakur (2010)11. We have also
considered the real exchange rate of the peseta over time as a potential
influence on Spanish imports. The results of combining these different
measures, after imposing the standard assumption of unit elasticity on the
adjusted economic size variables, are shown in Table 1. The first finding to
highlight is that transport costs are always highly significant. The same
occurs if, when testing for robustness, we proxy the trends of shipping costs
by the city- and commodity-specific indexes of Mohammed and Williamson
(2004)12. The exchange rate is also always significant. However, the only
significant tariff measures (Simple 1, Simple 2, Simple 3, Weighted 4 and
Weighted 5) are those that keep the sample of goods unchanged over the
period under study. The difference between the coefficients of the simple
and weighted measures is also important. The coefficients for the weighted
measures are significantly higher than those corresponding to the simple
measures (Weighted 4 vs. Simple 1, both calculated for the whole unchan-
ged sample; Weighted 5 vs. Simple 3, both calculated for the industrial
unchanged sample), in line with the criticism of undervaluation against
the former mentioned above. From here on, we will focus on the results
obtained when considering simple customs averages and, particularly, the
11 Consequently, we follow Jacks and Pendakur (2010) when they incorporate some of their
country-pair specific freight rates into a gravity equation. We have also considered the possibility of
those rates being endogenous to trade. However, the Hausman test of endogeneity yields a rejection
of the hypothesis. This rejection may be related to the size of Spain, the country being too small for
its demand for imports to influence international freight rates.
12 We applied the Coal to Genoa rate index to the imports from the Austro-Hungarian empire,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom, and the
Baltic-grain index to the imports from Finland, Norway and Sweden In the case of the United States
of America and Canada, we used the East North America-grain index. Finally, we applied the East
Latin America-grain index to the Brazilian and Uruguayan imports and the West North America-grain
index to the imports coming from Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The coefficients maintain
their range between 22.5 and 23.6 and are all highly significant.
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TABLE 1
GRAVITY ESTIMATIONS OF TRADE COSTS
Weighted averages Simple averages
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 S1 S2 S3
Transport
costs
22.84 (25.06) 22.61 (24.43) 22.46 (24.14) 22.98 (24.97) 23.29 (25.13) 23.60 (25.22) 23.07 (24.67) 23.18 (24.82)
Currency 1.55 (5.78) 1.57 (5.80) 1.53 (5.53) 2.03 (6.71) 1.78 (6.38) 1.51 (5.59) 1.55 (5.96) 1.52 (5.86)
Customs 21.73 (20.93) 20.16 (20.11) 1.50 (0.98) 25.48 (23.76) 23.84 (23.70) 20.85 (23.38) 21.94 (22.21) 21.81 (22.73)
N 690 690 690 690 690 690 690 690
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
W, weighted; S, simple.
Notes: W1 calculated with official values; W2, W3, calculated with corrected values, the latter including sugar surcharges; W4 calculated with corrected
values maintaining the sample fixed; W5, as W4, for only industrial goods.
S1 calculated for the same sample as W4; S2 is S1 without overseas products; S3, for the same sample as W5.
Estimations are country-fixed effects.
Source: See text.
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Simple 2 average, calculated for the unchanged sample of goods with the
exclusion of overseas food13.
This average is a simple one and therefore, as explained before, we
assume that its individual elasticity l15 1 and calculate the elasticity of
substitution starting from the estimated coefficient g15 (12s). Since the
coefficient obtained for the protection measure is 1.94, we find that the
elasticity of substitution among Spanish imports is 2.94 when transport costs
and fluctuations in the real exchange rate are controlled for. This is an
interesting result because it is directly estimated from the panel data and is
near the usual elasticity values found in the literature14.
By using our estimated elasticity of substitution among the Spanish imports,
we calculate that the elasticities of the maritime freight rates and the peseta real
exchange rate in the trade costs function are 1.58 and 20.80, respectively. This
yields a trade costs tariff equivalent, t, that averages 112 per cent during 1870-
1913, 65 points coming from transport costs, 22 from customs and 7 from the
exchange rate15. Our estimated trade costs tariff equivalent is above those
computed by Jacks et al. (2010). These authors, by assuming a price elasticity of
imports of 11 (s511), derive a comprehensive measure of trade costs for the
United Kingdom, France and the United States, which ranges from a minimum
of around 30 per cent (in the United Kingdom in 1913) to a maximum of 48 per
cent (in the United States in 1870). However, our tariff equivalent level is not
directly comparable to theirs. First, our assumption about the level of maritime
transport costs to which to apply the indexes of Jacks and Pendakur (2010) is
overestimating our tariff equivalent level16. Second, they hypothesize a high
elasticity value, which might be underestimating their tariff equivalents.
Fortunately, the comparison of levels is not the goal of this paper. Rather
than in the absolute level of the trade costs tariff equivalent and its average
during 1870-1913, which are clearly sensitive to the elasticity considered, we
are interested in the changes in the dynamics of its components (transport
13 We select Simple 2 against Simple 1 because our country sample does not include Cuba, by
far the main supplier of exotic food (sugar and coffee) until 1898. As the exclusion of Cuba means
the exclusion of exotic food, we selected the Simple 2 measure as being more representative of the
average customs barrier raised against the goods imported from the countries in our sample.
14 In the literature on gravity equations, we find estimations of s that range from 2 to 5.3 in the
second half of the 20th century (Hummels 2001), the estimations lowering with increases in the level
of trade aggregation (Hummels 2001; Chaney 2006). Since we work at the highest level of aggre-
gation, some of the goods in our sample (wheat, coal, cotton) are difficult to substitute. This might
explain the similarity of our elasticity to that obtained for the second half of the 20th century,
although the degree of differentiation for qualities of the same good is accepted to be lower in recent
decades.
15 The residuals from the estimations of the gravity equation amount to 18 per cent points.
16 Following Estevadeordal et al. (2003), we took the 22.1 freight rate given by Williamson
(2002) for the ton of wheat on Atlantic routes in 1910, adjusted backward by applying the indexes of
Jacks and Pendakur (2010). Since this rate corresponds to a bulk commodity and is probably higher
than the rates for manufactured goods imported by Spain, we are conscious that the level of the
transport cost tariff equivalent might be upwardly biased.
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costs, commercial policy and currency). We are looking for a confirmation of
the Spanish protectionist backlash against the decline in international
transport costs and the supposedly protectionist role played by a currency
that did not join the gold standard. To this end, the trajectories of the trade
costs tariff equivalent and its components, not seriously affected by the
elasticity value chosen, are far more informative. Looking at Figure 6, we
find that the tariff equivalent was reduced from 156 per cent to 104 per cent
between 1870 and 1913 and, above all, we find that the trends shown by its
components match the economic history narrative perfectly17. Behind the
downward trend in the transport costs component, it is easy to recognize
the technological improvements in maritime shipping (among them, the
introduction of the screw propeller, the compound engine, steel hulls
and the increase in ship sizes)18. We also find that the slight decrease in
FIGURE 6
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17 The tariff equivalent levels are sensitive to the elasticity of substitution. However, as proof
that the tariff equivalent is robust to changes in elasticities, we tried the extreme value s5 11. By
doing so, we found that the tariff equivalent falls from 20 per cent to 15 per cent between 1870 and
1913. Thus, the tariff equivalent drops by 25 per cent instead of the 33 per cent fall when working
with a value s5 2.94. Most importantly, the differences in the relative contributions of the indivi-
dual barriers (customs, currency and transport costs) to the trade costs tariff equivalent average and
their movements over time are negligible.
18 For a description of the so-called transport revolution, see O’Rourke and Williamson (1999).
According to Mohammed and Williamson (2004), between 1871-1873 and 1909-1911, freight rates
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the customs and exchange rate components during the 80s matches the
historical record.
On May 11, 1882, Spain signed a treaty with France in which the two
countries exchanged significant concessions. Spain agreed to cut customs for
many manufactured items and France, in exchange, substantially reduced
duties on the Spanish import of wine, from 3.5 to 2 francs/hectolitre. More
importantly, soon after this, the Spanish reductions agreed in the treaty were
included as a second column of duties in the bill of July 1882. This second
column was applied to the countries that enjoyed the Most Favoured Nation
Clause in their relationship with Spain, which, in the mid-80s (after the
Modus Vivendi signed with the United Kingdom in 1885), applied to more
than 90 per cent of the value of Spanish imports19.
In the same direction as customs, the exchange rate also facilitated the
entry of foreign goods into Spain. In 1870, at the beginning of the period
under examination, the Spanish monetary standard was bimetallic (gold and
silver) and, for that reason, was fully affected by the sustained decline in the
international price of silver initiated in 1867. This fall in prices meant silver
overvaluation at the mint. Minting silver became a profitable business and
silver coins quickly started to oust increasingly valuable gold from circula-
tion. To put an end to this process, the Spanish authorities declared their
intention of abandoning bimetallism in favor of gold and prohibited the
private mintage of silver through a decree in August 187620. Nevertheless,
despite this measure, budgetary problems led the Spanish government to
continue the profitable minting of silver while continuing to monetize defi-
cits through bond sales to the Bank of Spain21. In this way, the growth in fiat
money (overvalued silver and paper), by offsetting the continuous hoarding
of gold, was enough to increase the Spanish money supply and isolate
domestic prices from the international deflation of the 70s.
During this decade, however, the pressure on the reserves of the Bank of
Spain was kept under control. As mentioned before, the peseta never formally
belonged to the gold standard. Convertibility was always a discretional
issue for the Bank which, in fact, repeatedly limited this possibility22.
(F’note continued)
declined due to the introduction of iron hulls and the drop in ship prices, which was the result of
productivity gains in the shipbuilding industry. Until 1887-1889, productivity gains in the coal
industry reinforced the decline in maritime transport costs.
19 The Spanish–French treaty and the bill of 1882 are thoroughly studied in Serrano-Sanz
(1987). This work also covers the tariff reform of 1891 and details the other Spanish treaties from
1882 to 1895.
20 Martı´n-Acen˜a (2000) provides a detailed account of Spanish monetary history from the
creation of the peseta in 1868 until 1913.
21 The existence of a link between budget and money in Spain during the classical and the
exchange-rate gold standards is illustrated in Sabate´ et al. (2006).
22 In 1876, the Bank of Spain refused gold conversion even to the Spanish government.
Moreover, during the years 1876-1877, gold conversion was limited to 2,500 pesetas per month.
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The problems, however, did not become unsustainable until the 80s when the
drop in capital inflows caused by the French stock crisis depreciated the
peseta enough to make the export of gold profitable, thus stimulating paper
conversion. As a consequence, despite the Bank having rationed convert-
ibility, its gold reserves were reduced from 126 million pesetas in 1881 to
61 million in 1882. When, in 1883, the reserves decreased to 36 million
pesetas, the Bank decided to suspend convertibility and it would never be
resumed. However, despite price divergence, the peseta nominal exchange
rate remained quite stable after the suspension, thanks to the exceptional
exports of wine to France along with the offsetting role played by private
exports of gold23. The result was a real appreciation of the peseta in the 80s,
which, combined with the simultaneous decrease in maritime freights and
customs barriers, explains the fall in the total tariff equivalent in that decade24.
However, in the early 90s, as shown in Figure 6, this harmony of declining
barriers was broken and, while transport costs continued to go down, the
Spanish customs component started to rise. In fact, the first step in the
Spanish tariff protectionist reform of 1890-1891 was defended as a means to
offset the declining prices of grain imports resulting from technological
advances in transport. As a result of this competition, the price of wheat in
Barcelona had decreased from 26.7 to 22.3 pesetas/hectolitre between 1880
and 1885, pushing down the domestic average from 23.9 to 19.9 pesetas,
respectively25. As a first response to this internationally induced drop in
domestic prices, several measures aimed at improving productivity were
taken26. However, as time went by and gains in efficiency failed to stop the
advance of imports, the decision was taken to reinforce protection27. In
December 1890, tariffs on grains and rice were raised. Tariffs were also
(F’note continued)
Even when, in 1878, the gold reserves approached the amount of issued notes, the Bank still refused
to declare full convertibility, preferring to relax the limit and establish an automatic convertibility
up to 1,000 pesetas per day. See Serrano-Sanz (2004) for a detailed account of the resistance of the
Bank to full convertibility.
23 Following the treaty of 1882, in the late 80s, exports of wine accounted for over one-third of
total Spanish exports, 85 per cent of them going to France. The export of gold (emigration of gold,
according to contemporaries) is well documented in Barthe (1905) and Jime´nez-Rodriguez (1905).
A specific term, chalequeros, was even coined for the people who, in the 80s, crossed the Pyrenees
wearing special vests, chalecos, with compartments full of gold (Jime´nez-Rodriguez 1905, p. 166).
24 A structural change in the mean, located in the interval 1878-1883, econometrically confirms
the real appreciation of the peseta. See Sabate´ et al. (2003, 2005).
25 GEHR (1980), p. 96. Between those years, the price of the hectolitre in London decreased
from 0.76 to 0.53 pounds. See GEHR (1980) and Garrabou and Sanz-Ferna´ndez (1985).
26 Different bodies were created to spread technical formation (school farms, granjas escuela)
and help peasants with the selection of seeds and the fight against plagues. Moreover, investment in
land irrigation was increased. For an exhaustive list of decrees and laws approving these and other
related measures, see Serrano-Sanz (1987, pp. 101-102).
27 As proof of the difficulties experienced by domestic producers, no Castilian grain was sold in
Barcelona during 1885-1889. Garrabou and Sanz-Ferna´ndez (1985, p. 177).
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increased on meat, whose imports, coming from Australia and Argentina,
had registered a great increase in the 80s due to the combined effect of
declining transport costs plus refrigeration28. In this way, Spain started the
retreat from liberalization that characterized the reaction of continental
Europe to the land rent losses brought about by the grain invasion from
Russia and overseas29. The retreat mirrors the social significance of land-
owners in the Spain of the late 19th century30.
The second step in the retreat was the approval of the bill of December 31,
1891, which, as well as including the raised tariffs on agrarian products,
increased most of the customs for manufactured items. The reason argued
for this remarkable increase in the duties on manufacture was one of stra-
tegic policy. In January 1891, France had denounced the treaty signed with
Spain in 1882, meaning that, from February 1892, if a new treaty were not
agreed upon, Spanish wine would have to pay the duties resulting from the
tariff reform then in progress in the French Assembly. As is well known, the
Me´line bill, finally passed in December 1891, included a generalized increase
in customs that was especially punishing for Spanish wine because its duties
were raised from the previous range of between 2 and 3.5 francs/hectolitre to
another of between 14.8 and 19.8 francs. The Spanish response consisted of
inflating the duties on manufactures in its bill of 1891, also approved in
December31, and then offering France a treaty that included a cut in duties
on Spanish manufactures in exchange for a reduction in French duties on
Spanish wine32. To reinforce the appeal of the proposal, Spain offered these
cuts in exclusivity. However, France’s interest in the Spanish market was
much less than Spain’s in the French. In 1890, Spain received only 5 per cent
of total French exports, while France received 45 per cent of total Spanish
exports. This meant that Spain had to negotiate by attacking «with a needle
against one defending with a sword»33 and, not surprisingly, the treaty was
never signed. Having lost the main market for its principal export (wine),
Spain only exchanged minor concessions with other countries (through
treaties with the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), which
28 The duties on wheat and flour were increased by 40 and 60 per cent, respectively. The duties
on meat were more than trebled.
29 See Findlay and O’Rourke (2003) for a summarized presentation of tariff changes in the
western world from the late 70s on. A more quantitative approach to the protectionist trends during
1865-1913 is offered in Williamson (2006).
30 The lobbying power of the agrarian oligarchy matches the slight fall in the Spanish wage-
rental ratio at the end of the 19th century perfectly, as documented in Rose´s et al. (2007).
31 According to Navarro-Reverter, the sub-secretary of the Treasury at that time, duties were
modified according to the answers of agrarian and industrial associations to the government
questionnaire and, on occasions, even surpassed their demands (DSCD, December 13, 1894).
32 The intention of using the bill of 1891 to interest France in an interchange of concessions is
profusely alluded to in the Spanish parliament. See, for example, the sessions of January 27 and
February 3 and 21, 1892.
33 Azca´rate (1892, p. 19).
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were far less important markets34. In the end, the result of the whole process
(the 1891 bill and the four treaties mentioned) was a significant increase in
customs at the beginning of the 90s. Accordingly, Figure 6 shows a rise of the
customs component that is in clear contrast to the decline registered by the
transport costs component.
As regards the movements of the exchange rate in the 90s, they contributed
to the trade costs tariff equivalent in the same direction as commercial policy,
that is to say, by increasing it. This common pattern can be clearly seen in
Figure 6 and even more so in Figure 7, where the Spanish policy barriers
(customs and exchange rate) have been added. The agrarian crisis of the mid-
80s seriously affected tax revenues, a significant deficit reappeared and the sale
of bonds to the Bank resumed to such an extent that, in 1890, fiat money
accounted for more than 80 per cent of legal tender. In these circumstances,
the Baring crisis in Argentina, by spreading doubts about the solvency of
countries with a weak treasury, led to a sharp drop in the capital flows to Spain.
The result was a significant depreciation of the peseta, which did not recoup
part of its losses until 1895, just before plummeting again as a consequence
of the risk that the markets assigned to the Spanish debt because of the
strongly renewed monetization of deficit to finance the war against Cuba and
FIGURE 7
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34 Around 1890, exports to the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland did not reach
5 per cent of Spanish exports compared with the figure of 45 per cent exported to France.
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the United States. In sum, the risk assigned to the Spanish Treasury led to a
decade of real depreciation for the peseta, which worked as a barrier for
imports. More importantly, the effect of this depreciation, added to the increase
in customs barriers, was enough for the Spanish trade costs tariff equivalent to
regain a substantial part of the level to which it had fallen in the 80s35.
The financial disorders of the war years, however, were quickly addres-
sed. A number of measures taken in 1899-1900 allowed the budget to close
with a surplus, debt held by the Bank of Spain was redeemed and prices were
stabilized36. The restoration of confidence in the Spanish Treasury plus the
renewal of foreign investment inflows (now focused on electricity and water
services) are the reasons put forward to explain the recovery, in 1906, of the
nominal exchange rate levels prior to the Baring crisis. From then on, the
relative control of public finances and domestic prices determined the sta-
bility of the exchange rate at around 26 pesetas to the pound and, as shown
in Figure 6, the exchange rate significantly reduced its role as a trade barrier.
At this point, it is worth highlighting the changing trends of the exchange
rate component, since these changes allow us to reconcile some apparently
divergent stances taken in the literature regarding the consequences of Spain
not having belonged to the gold standard. Returning to Figure 6, it is clear
that the performance of the exchange rate component is consistent with the
ideas of Prados de la Escosura (1988, 1997), Prados de la Escosura and Tena
(1994), Tortella (1994) and Sa´nchez-Alonso (1995), among others, when
arguing that the movements of the peseta reinforced the protection approved
in the tariff bill of 1891 and reduced that approved in the bill of 1906.
However, the trajectory of the exchange rate component also supports the
ideas of Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998) and Gadea and Sabate´ (2004), who,
finding evidence in favor of the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis,
argue in favor of a moderate role of the peseta in terms of protection. In their
opinion, the holding of the hypothesis means discarding the idea that
remaining out of the gold standard led to a continuous increase or decrease
of competitiveness for Spain. In this regard, the figure of 7 per cent that the
exchange rate component averages in the period 1870-1913 is consistent with
a long-run moderation in protectionist terms. In the same way, the variations
in the trend of the exchange component shown in Figure 6 match the
significant short-run deviations from parity found by Serrano-Sanz et al. (1998)
35 The striking asymmetry of customs and exchange rate tariff equivalents in 1898 can be
explained by the fact that the duties were specific (pesetas per unit of weight or volume). Therefore,
the effect of depreciation, by swelling the value of imports in pesetas, is reflected in a drop in the
ad valorem tariffs. This corresponds to the specific-duty effect which Williamson (2006) considers
when trying to capture the factors driving tariffs during 1865-1938. In our case, this cut in
ad valorem protection is counterbalanced by simultaneously considering the protection granted by
the inflated exchange rate. Figure 6 illustrates this complementarity, which is especially clear in the
critical year of 1898.
36 Summarized in Sabate´ et al. (2006).
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and Gadea and Sabate´ (2004) for the 80s (deviations of appreciation) and for
most of the 90s (deviations of depreciation)37. These variations serve to
reconcile positions: in the short run, the exchange rate played an active role
(reinforcing or loosening commercial barriers); in the long run, the average
effect was smoothed.
As regards transport costs and customs components, while the former
continued to follow a downward trend in the first decade of the 20th century,
the latter moved upward. Thus, the counterbalancing role of transport costs
and customs tariffs continued and this became especially clear when the bill
of 1906, by raising duties, restored the ad valorem customs levels of the 90s38.
In sum, two dynamics clearly emerge, one before and one after 1890, when
comparing the evolution of transport costs and customs components in
Figure 6. Before the 90s, the sharp reduction in transport costs took place in
FIGURE 8
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Source: see text.
37 In fact, Gadea and Sabate´ (2004) find that the year 1898 registered the highest residual
depreciating deviation from the PPP equilibrium in the period 1883-1931. The role played by
bellum-risk in this residual is confirmed when we introduce the variable level of public debt into the
error correction model. The short-run deviation between the actual and the fitted PPP exchange rate
then disappears.
38 For a detailed description of the political economy of protection between 1895 and 1913, see
Sabate´ (1996), where there is also a detailed account of the changes introduced into the Spanish
tariff structure by the bill of 1906.
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parallel with a slight decrease in customs and, thus, the decline in the
Spanish trade costs tariff equivalent was essentially driven by the path of
maritime freight rates. However, in the 90s, the increase in customs barriers
started an offsetting relationship between them that the tariff reform of 1906
sustained. Thus, from 1890 onward, especially when the exchange rate bar-
rier was lowered, trade policy becomes the most active force in defining the
profile of the Spanish trade costs tariff equivalent.
Finally, in Figure 8, we present this counterbalancing relationship in terms
of the accumulated contributions of the different barriers to the variations in
the ratio between Spanish trade and economic growth. According to this fig-
ure, the decline in transport costs, had the customs and the exchange rate
barriers remained unchanged, would have trebled the growth of imports in
1913. Also in the figure, it is easy to observe the offsetting role of customs plus
currency barriers after 1890. During the subperiod 1870-1890, customs and
currency as well as transport costs had contributed positively to the growth of
imports. In contrast, during the subperiod 1891-1913, the gains in the con-
tribution of transport costs were severely offset by the negative contribution of
Spanish policy barriers, especially in the decade of the 90s, when customs and
exchange rate barriers rose in similar fashion.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper estimates the relationship between three potential kinds of
trade barriers (transport costs, customs and currency) and Spanish imports
during 1870-1913. First, we find that customs tariffs have a significant
negative impact on trade as long as the selected protection measure controls
for the goods composition. We also show how the use of trade-weighted
measures, normally employed in these estimations, downwardly biases the
estimated effect of customs on imports. Second, whatever the customs
measure, transport costs and exchange rate always show a significant effect
on imports, both with the expected sign. Third, on the basis of their sig-
nificance, we have combined the three kinds of variables into a trade costs
function to obtain a single measure of trade barriers. This yields a trade costs
tariff equivalent average of 112 per cent ad valorem during 1870-1913, with
only 7 points coming from the exchange rate. As remarked before, the
moderate height averaged by the currency barrier during 1870-1913 fits in
with the idea of the peseta having played a long-run minor deterrent role on
trade. Even so, in the short run, as revealed by the evolution of the exchange
rate component, currency made significant (positive and negative) con-
tributions to the trade costs tariff equivalent. Thus, this paper reconciles the
short- and long-run approaches to the analysis of the protectionist con-
sequences of the fact that the peseta never formally belonged to the gold
standard. Finally, our estimations locate the start of an offsetting relationship
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between decreasing transport costs and increasing customs barriers in the
90s, in tune with the historical record, which dates the Spanish protectionist
backlash to the tariff reform of 1890-1891.
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